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NOTES
TRIAL BY JURY IN INDIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPTS
In 1941 the Supreme Court struck two telling blows at the summary power of
a judge to punish indirect criminal contempts of court,' Nye v. United Statee
2 The conclusions of this note as to the right of trial by jury pertain to all indirect criminal
contempts except those which consist of disobedience to any court order or decree. Indirect or
constructive contempts are those which are not committed "in the presence of [the] courts,
or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." 4 Stat. 487 (1831), 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 385 (1928); see Charles Cushman Co. v. Mackesy, 135 Me. 490, 494, 2oo AtI. 505, 508
(1938). Criminal contempts are those in which the sentence imposed is not "remedial, and for
the benefit of complainant ....
[but] punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court."
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (igi). Although the lines of distinction may become tenuous, as in United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 67 S. Ct.
677 (1947), the above definitions will be satisfactory for the purposes of this note.
2 33

U.S. 33 (1941)-
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effectively removed all indirect contempts except disobedience of court orders
from the field of offenses punishable summarily in the federal courts. The full
impact of Bridges v. California,3 as two subsequent cases have shown,4 has been
to immunize virtually all out-of-court comment on judicial proceedings,
whether spoken or written, against citation and punishment as contempt of
court. Since such out-of-court comment falls within the scope of the decision in
the Nye case, the Bridgesdecision does not affect the power of the federal courts,
but curbs only state court judges. In neither case, however, did the Court consider the crux of the problem: the real flaw in the summary contempt power
which has subjected it to constant attack by legal scholars.5 Such attack has
been leveled primarily at the summary nature of the proceedings--summary in
6
that contemners are tried by a judge alone, without receiving a jury trial.
Critics of the contempt power contend that, since criminal contempts are criminal acts,7 constitutional guarantees of trial by jury' should apply to contempt
proceedings. Although this right has been universally denied by the courts, research indicates that such denial has been based on extremely dubious authority.9 Until the Supreme Court recognizes this fact and includes indirect contempts within the jury trial guarantee, any other limitations of the contempt
power such as those established by the Nye and Bridgescases cannot succeed in
restricting that power to its proper scope.
In the Nye case, the Supreme Court's primary concern was with the proper
construction of the Act of March 2, 1831:
3 3I4 U.S. 252 (1941).
4 Craig v. Hamrey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
s C. H. Thomas, Problems of Contempt of Court (ig34); Fox, The History of Contempt
of Court (1927); J. L. Thomas, The Law of Constructive Contempt (19o4); i Livingston,
Complete Works on Criminal jurisprudence 264 (r873); Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 Col. L. Rev: 4o, 525 (x928); Frankfurter and Landis, Power
of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempt in Inferior Federal Courts-a Study in
Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. ioo (I924).
6 Additional opposition has been directed at the fact that customarily, in the absence of
statute, the same judge whose decision has been criticized, or whose authority has been flouted
by the contemptuous act, tries the offending party in contempt proceedings. Compare Taft,
C. J., concurring in Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 279 (1923): "The delicacy there is in the
judge's deciding whether an attack upon his own judicial action is mere criticism or real obstruction, and the possibility that impulse may incline his view to personal vindication, are
manifest."
7 "These contempts are infractions of the law, visited with punishment as such. If such
acts are not criminal, we are in error as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as that
word has been understood in English speech. So truly are they crimes that it seems to be proved
that in the early law they were punished only by the usual criminal procedure, 3 Transactions
of the Royal Historical Society, N.S. 147 (1885), and that at least in England it seems that they
still may be and preferably are tried in that way." Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604,

6Io (1914).

8U.S. Const. Amend. 6, and similar provisions in state constitutions.
9Fox, op. cit. supra note 5; see Part III, infra.
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Chap. xcix. Anz Act declaratoryof the law concerning contempts of court.
Be it enacted, etc., That the power of the several courts of the United States to issue
attachments and inflict summary punishments for contempts of court, shall not be
construed to extend to any cases except the misbehaviour of any person or persons in
the presence of said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice..... The Act had been passed as the direct result of impeachment proceedings
against judge Peck of the United States District Court of Missouri.- Luke Lawless, unsuccessful counsel in a land grant case before judge Peck, had published a
statement of the errors which he contended the judge had made in his decisiona statement which has been called "as unfair as can be imagined. ' ' 12 Judge Peck
promptly instituted contempt proceedings and found Lawless guilty, sentencing
him to one day's imprisonment and eighteen months' suspension from practicing
law. Lawless, a man of no little influence, presented a memorial for Peck's impeachment to Congress, which was acted upon in x83o . The House voted to
present articles of impeachment, and a long and sensational trial resulted in
acquittal by the Senate, twenty-two to twenty-one. Acquittal, however, indicated only that judge Peck had acted constitutionally in the eyes of Congress;
that body acted quickly to dispel any notion that it approved such an exercise
of the contempt power by passing the limiting statute quoted above. James
Buchanan, leading manager of the impeachment and author of the Act of 1831,
had insisted that no judge in the United States possessed a common-law power
to punish summarily, as contempt, any publication regarding judicial proceedings, past or pending, summary punishment being ". . . . equally at war with
the spirit and the letter of the Constitution.' I 3 This contention as to the existing
law of contempt explains the titling of the act as "declaratory" of the law con4
cerning contempt.
Cases decided shortly after passage of the act construed it in its literal sense,
as expressly excluding from summary punishment all publications out of court,
whatever their intended or actual effect might be.s justice Baldwin found the
statute's "language too plain to doubt of the meaning of the law,"' 6 holding
that publications out of court could not be considered misbehavior so near the
presence of the court as to obstruct the administration of justice, and that
104 Stat. 487 (1831),

28

U.S.C.A. § 385 (1928).

"1For complete discussions of the events leading to the impeachment and the proceedings
themselves, see Stansbury, Report of the Trial of James H. Peck (1833), and Nelles and King,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 423-31.

- Nelles and King, op. cit. supra note 5, at 428.
13 Ibid., at 526.
14Thomas, Problems of Contempt of Court 58 (1934).
ISEx parte Poulson, xg Fed. Cas. 12o5, No. 11,35o (C.C.Pa., 1835); United States v.
Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360, No. 15,383 (C.C.Pa., 1842).
z6 Ex parte Poulson, ig Fed. Cas. i2o5, No. 11,350, at 1207 (C.C.Pa., 1835).
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only ".
misbehavior which is calculated to disturb the order of the court,
such as noise, tumultuous or disorderly behavior, either in it or near it"'1 was
summarily punishable. The additional fact that Justice Baldwin criticized the
statute as an unwise exercise of congressional power and would have reached
a contrary decision had the statute permitted any other construction, lends
weight to the probable validity of his statutory interpretation.
The Supreme Court at first seemed to approve Justice Baldwin's construction,"3 but later the requirement of physical proximity for out-of-court misbehavior was gradually relaxed.'9 The lower federal courts virtually construed
the statute out of existence by giving the words "so near thereto" a causal
rather than a geographical meaning:
If it is a contempt to bribe a witness in front of the courthouse door, is it not a
contempt to do the same thing on the streets opposite the court building, or four blocks
away? ....In one case the misbehavior would be construed to be in the presence of
the court, and in the other "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice," and the statute, in clear language, is made to apply to both cases*
Finally, in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States,= the Supreme Court
affirmed a contempt conviction which was the outgrowth of newspaper publications attacking District Judge Killits and the local traction company in connection with a suit then pending. Its decision not only approved the distorted construction of the Act of 1831, but went far beyond. Chief Justice White first
pointed out that "it is essential to recall the situation existing atthe time-of the
adoption of the Act of 1831 in order to elucidate its provisions";" then, strangely enough, he ignored history and completely nullified the statute by concluding
that

.....

there can be no doubt that the provision conferred no power not

already granted and imposed no limitations not already existing. In other words,
it served but to plainly mark the boundaries of the existing authority resulting
from the grants which the Constitution made and the limitations which it imposed."'23The defendant was found guilty of contempt. After eighty-seven years
the act had indeed become merely "declaratory of the law concerning contempt"--but in a manner to astonish its authors.
Justice Holmes was unable to concur in what has been termed "this
Ibid., at 1208.
'8See Ex parte Robinson, ig Wall. (U.S.)
17

5o5, 511 (1873): "As thus seen, the power of
these courts in the punishment of contempts can only be exercised to insure order and decorum
in their presence .......
19Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 280 (1889); Savin, Petitioner, i31 U.S. 267, 277 (1889);
United States v. Anonymous, 21 Fed. 761, 769 (C.C.Tenn., 1884); In re May, i Fed. 737
(D.C.Mich., z88o).
20In re Brule, 71 Fed. 943, 948 (D.C.Nev., 1895); cf. United States v. Huff, 2o6 Fed. 700,
705 (D.C.Ga., 1913); Kirk v. United States, 192 Fed. 273, 277 (C.C.A. 9th, r9ii); McCaully
v. United States, 25 App. D.C. 404, 413 (19o5), cert. den. i98 U.S. 586 (igo5); ExparteMcLeod, 12o Fed. 130, 137, 139-41 (D.C.Ala., 19o3).
247 U.S. 402 (1918).
" Ibid., at 416.

3Ibid., at 418,
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amazing historical solecism of the late Chief Justice."24 He found the limitations imposed by the statute "too plain to be construed away.' ' 2s More important, Justice Holmes dissented on the additional ground that, even if the
publications involved justified punishment, contempt proceedings did not
furnish the proper form of trial. His dissent rested on a sharp criticism of summary proceedings in indirect contempt cases:.
When it is considered how contrary it is to our practice and ways of thinking for the
same person to be accuser and sole judge in a matter which, if he be sensitive, may
involve strong personal feeling, I should expect the power to be limited by the necessities of the case "to insure order and decorum in their presence." ....I would go as

far as any man in favor of the sharpest and most summary enforcement of order in
Court and obedience to decrees, but when there is no need for immediate action contempts are like any other breach of law and should be dealt with as the law deals with
other illegal acts.A
This statement can refer only to ordinary criminal proceedings, which incorporate the right to jury trial. To Justice Holmes, then, the primary objection to the Toledo Newspaper case lay in the denial of trial by jury, and it is this
dissent which was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in the Nye case.
No publication was involved in the Nye case; defendants were guilty of far
more reprehensible conduct than criticizing a judge. By plying a feeble-minded,
illiterate old man with liquor, they had induced him to terminate an action for
causing the death of his son by use of a patent medicine. As soon as the trial
judge discovered these facts, he had cited the defendants for contempt. The
Supreme Court overruled the Toledo Newspaper case, holding that since the
events had taken place over ioo miles away from the District Court, they could
not be construed as coming under the "so near thereto" clause. The Act of 1831
was once again applied in its literal sense, with the Court approving Justice
Baldwin's interpretation in the Poulson case.27
Confronted with actions which certainly merited punishment, the Court
could easily have upheld the conviction; it had only to apply the rule of statutory construction that once the Court has interpreted a statute, it is the function of Congress to alter the act if the interpretation is contrary to legislative
intent. However, Justice Douglas expressly rejected such a procedure,
saying:

Thus the legislative history of this statute and its career demonstrate that this case
presents the question of correcting a plain misreading of language and history so as to
give full respect to the meaning which Congress unmistakably intended the statute to
have. Its legislative history, its interpretation prior to ig8, the character and nature
of the contempt proceedings, admonish us not to give renewed vitality to the doctrine
24Frankfurter

and Landis, op. cit. supra note 5,at io3o.
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 423 (1918).
26Ibid., at 423, 425.
2SToledo

27Nye

v,United States, 3i3 U.S. 33, 50 (z941).
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of Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, but to recognize the substantive legislative
limitations on the contempt power which were occasioned by the Judge Peck episode.
And they necessitate an adherence to the original construction of the statute so that
unless its requirements are clearly satisfied, an offense will be dealt with as the law
8
deals with the run of illegal acts.
The Court's willingness to overrule the Toledo Newspaper decision cannot be
attributed to its desire to uphold the constitutional guarantee of free speech,29 as
might have been the case had publications been involved in the Nye case. The
nature of the offense involved, as well as the reference to dealing with contempts
"as the law deals with the run of illegal acts," indicate that the Court's primary
concern was once again the right of jury trial in proceedings which are essentially criminal.
Under the Act of 1831 as now interpreted, no judge in the inferior federal
courts3 0 possesses the power of summary punishment of any out-of-court misbehavior except acts which may be classified as disobedience of valid court
orders.31 However, state court judges are not affected by the provisions of the
statute. Contempt convictions by state courts can only be appealed to the
United States Supreme Court on charges that constitutional rights have been
infringed; thus the exercise of the summary power in indirect contempt cases has
naturally been attacked as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Patterson v. Colorado,32 the Supreme Court of Colorado had fined the publisher of
newspaper articles reflecting on the motives and conduct of that court in cases
pending before it. The defendant appealed the conviction on the ground that it
infringed the constitutional guarantee of a free press.3 3 Justice Holmes,
speaking for the Court, expressly declined to decide whether the Fourteenth
Amendment had created a prohibition applicable to the states similar to that
which the First Amendment had placed on the federal government, contending
that even if it had, the defendant could not prevail. This conclusion was
grounded in the Blackstonian theory of liberty of the press: that the constitutional provision was intended only to prevent "laying .... previous restraint
upon publications, and not [to grant ] freedom from censure for criminal matter
when published."34 Justice Harlan, dissenting, stated that "it would seem
dear that when the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the States from impairing or abridging the privileges of citizens of the United States it necessarily prohibited the States from impairing or abridging the constitutional rights of such
8

29 U.S. Const. Amend. i.
For the reason that the statute is said to place no restriction on the justices of the Supreme Court, see text at note 70 infra.
31 The full list of exceptions contained in the statute includes ....
misbehavior of any of
the officers of said courts in their official transactions,-and the disobedience or resistance by
any such officer, or by any party, juror, witness, or other person to any lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts." 4 Stat. 487 (1831), 28 U.S.C.A. § 385

2 Ibid., at SI.
30

(1928).
--

205

U.S. 454 (19O7).

33

U.S. Const. Amend. 1.

s4 4

Bl. Comm. *iSi.
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citizens to free speech and a free press.""3 Justice Harlan concluded his
opinion with a denunciation of the majority's restrictive construction of the
First Amendment.36
The Pattersoncase dissent, anticipating as it did the Bridges case by thirtyfour years, acquired the approval of the Court only gradually. In Schenk v.
United States,37 Justice Holmes modified his acceptance of Blackstone's
theory of liberty of the press, a doctrine since completely repudiated by the
Court.' 8 The application of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit state encroachments upon freedom of speech and of the press was slower in coming. It
was first expressly recognized in 1925,39 and subsequent Supreme Court decisions prior to the Bridges case firmly established the position.40 Consequently,
foreseeing probable success on that issue, the defendants' appeal from a summary punishment of allegedly contemptuous publications in the Bridges case
was based solely on the California court's abridgement of free speech, although
denial of the right to trial by jury had been argued below.41 Split five to four, the
Court held that the rights of free speech and a free press necessarily limited the
summary "power of all American courts, both state and federal, including this
one,"42 to punish for contempt of court.
In its decision, the majority first rejected the notion that the First Amend35Patterson v. Colorado,

205

U.S. 454, 464 (19o7).

cannot assent to that view ....
[If] the rights of free speech and of a free press are,
in their essence, attributes of national citizenship, as I think they are, then neither Congress
nor any State since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment can, by legislative enactments
or by judicial action, impair or abridge them ..... I go further and hold that the privileges of
free speech and of a free press, belonging to every citizen of the United States, constitute essential parts of every man's liberty, and are protected against violation by that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding a State to deprive any person of his liberty without due process
of law." Ibid., at 465.
36 "1

37

249 U.S. 47, 5I (1919)-

U.S. 697, 714 (1931)"For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the presswhich are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress-are among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925). But see Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 431 (1926).
4o Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368
(1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 244 (1936); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 3oi
U.S. 242, 258 (1937); Lovell v. Griffin, 3o3 U.S. 444, 450 (x938); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S.
496, 512 (i939); Schneider v. State, 3o8 U.S. 147, i6o (939); Thornhill v. Alabama, 3io U.S.
88, 95 (194o); Carlson v. California, 31o U.S. io6, 113 (194o); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 3io
U.S. 296, 303 (194o); see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371, 373 (1927); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324, 326 (1938).
38 Near v. Minnesota, 283
39

4' Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 477, 94 P. 2d 983, 99o (i939); Los Angeles
Times-lirror Co. v. Superior Court, zS Cal. 2d. 99, 102, 98 P. 2d 1029, 1031 (1940).
42 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (194).
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ment was not intended to apply to contempt proceedings to punish out-of-court
publications pertaining to pending cases, insisting instead that "..... the only

conclusion supported by history is that the unqualified prohibitions laid down
by the framers were intended to give to liberty of the press, as to other liberties,
the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society."43 Next,
the court considered just how broad that scope should be. The California court
had followed the Patters n and Toledo Newspaper cases in holding that publications which had a "reasonable tendency" to obstruct the administration of justice in cases pending before a court could be punished as contempt.4 4 The Supreme Court ruled that the "reasonable tendency" test did not afford defendants
the full freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment, and that publications are
punishable as contempt only when ".. . . the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about substantive evils."45 This "clear and present danger"
test46was recognized not as marking "the furthermost constitutional boundaries
of protected expression, .... [but] a minimum compulsion of the Bill of
Rights."47 Effectively, then, the summary punishment of a large class of indirect contempts had been severely curtailed.
Justice Frankfurter, representing the four dissenters in the Bridges case,
accused the majority of disregarding history by discarding the ancient "reasonable tendency" test; he vehemently denied that punishment for contempt is
limited by the First Amendment.48 But the dissenting justices failed to realize
43 Ibid.,

at 265.

Compare Holmes, J., in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,463 (i9o7): "But if a court
regards, as it may, a publication concerning a matter of law pending before it, as tending toward such an interference [with its administration of justice], it may punish it as in the instance put." (Italics added) The Supreme Court adopted the standard in Toledo Newspaper
44

Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402,

421

(igI8):

".

.

.

. not the influence upon the mind of the

particular judge is the criterion, but the reasonable tendeny of the acts done to influence or
bring about the baleful result is the test." (Italics added) The California Supreme Court adopted the "reasonable tendendy" standard in Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 489, 94
P. 2d 983, 996 (x939).
45Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
46 First

252,

261 (1941).

enunciated by Holmes, J., in Schenk v. United States,

249 U.S. 47, 52 (199). It
was proposed by a minority of the Court as applicable in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 627 (I19); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920); Pierce v. United States,
252 U.S. 239, 255 (1920); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925); and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring
opinion by Brandeis, J.). Prior to the Bridges case, the majority of the Court had adopted it in
Herndon v. Lowry, 3o U.S. 242, 256 (1937); Thornhill v. Alabama, 31o U.S. 88, io5 (194o);
Carlson v. California, 3io U.S. io6, 113 (1940); and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
308 (1940).
47 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
48 "But that the conventional power to punish for contempt is not a censorship in advance
but a punishment for past conduct and, as such, like prosecution for a criminal libel, is not offensive either to the First or Fourteenth Amendments, has never been doubted throughout
this Court's history." Ibid., at 290. The Blackstonian doctrine of "previous restraints,"
thought to have been exploded, reappears here.

NOTES
that limiting punishment to publications which have a "reasonable tendency to
obstruct the administration of justice," as they proposed, also involves recognition of the guarantees of free speech and a free press. If those guarantees did not
apply, there would be nothing to prevent a judge from citing as contempt any
publication pertaining to courts, even if such publication failed to meet the
"reasonable tendency" requirement. Actually the application of the First
Amendment is implicit in either standard; the difference between them is one of
degree only. Adoption of the "clear and present danger" test merely moves the
dividing line between punishable and non-punishable acts farther up the scale of
obstructiveness, so that fewer are subject to the summary contempt procedure.
The replacement of one test, which had long been considered constitutional, by
Another seemingly more stringent, discloses more than a concern for freedom of
speech. Such a replacement reveals, as in the Nye case, a desire to restrict sharply the use of summary contempt power by judges.
The new test was unanimously approved in Pennekamp v. Florida,49another
case involving a contempt citation against publications. The uncertainty as to
the effect of a state statute empowering the courts to punish indirect contempts
summarily, left in doubt by the Bridges cases ° was removed completely, since
the Court declared that statutes and judicial decisions alike must meet the
"clear and present danger" test. The standard itself received no clearer exposition, because the Court again ruled that it had not been met. However,
Justice Murphy, in a concurring opinion, declared, "To talk of a clear and
present danger arising out of such criticism is idle unless the criticism makes it
impossible in a very real sense to carry on the administration of justice." 5'
Under this view, actual physical obstruction is virtually essential to a contempt
punishment, if the contemnor has been able to assert his right of free speech as a
curb on the court's power.
Although the majority of the Court would undoubtedly deny that the scope
of immunity is so great, its most recent consideration of the problem in Craigv.
HarneyS2 has brought it close to such a stand. In the Craigcase, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals had applied the Bridges doctrine to newspaper articles
sharply critical of a trial judge's decision in a forcible entry and detainer proceeding. A motion for new trial was pending before the same judge, whose place
on the bench was elective, and the newspaper involved was extremely influential. Hence the Texas court had concluded that there was in fact a clear and
present danger that the publications involved would accomplish their purpose of
compelling the judge to change his decision on the pending motion, and that
" .... the likelihood that such result would follow was 'extremely serious and
4328 U.S. 331 (1946).
P Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (194i). The Florida court had distinguished the
Bridges case on this basis in Pennekamp v. State, z56 Fla. 227, 241-44, 248, 22 So. 2d 875, 88384, 886 (I945).
P'Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 370 (1946).
s

331

U.S. 367 (1947). Justice Murphy restated his views in a concurring opinion at 383.
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the degree of imminence extremely high.' ,,53 Yet the Supreme Court, applying
the same rule to the facts, asserted that" .... it takes more imagination than
we possess to find in this rather sketchy and one-sided report of a case any imminent or serious threat to a judge of reasonable fortitude."4 justice
Frankfurter, in a strongly worded dissent, condemned the majority view as
failing to give sufficient weight to the decision of the state court, and in so doing,
decried justice Murphy's stand.ss But more important is the fact that two
so violently opposed positions can be produced by a single set of circumstances.
A few sentences in justice Frankfurter's opinion unwittingly point to the
proper solution: "Surely a jury could reach such a conclusion on these facts.
We ought not to allow less leeway to the Texas Court in drawing inferences than
we would to a jury. Because it is a question of degree, the field in which a court,
like a jury, may 'exercise its judgment is necessarily a wide one.' ,,s6 The Supreme Court has shown its concern over the lack of jury trial in indirect contempt proceedings in the Nye and Bridges decisions; it has established a standard which is applied by a jury in all other cases. 57 What has prevented the seemingly logical adoption of the procedure of trial by jury in this class of cases?
II
Between 1855 and the i94i decision in the Nye case, virtually all American
courts successfully resisted any attempts to limit their powers to punish summarily for contempt, whether the attempted limitation was legislation enumerating the acts so punishable, or setting up the procedural safeguard of jury trial
for the contemner. This resistance by the courts has been explained as a product
of "the energy with which men, judges included, seek power as power, and the
personal weakness and sensitiveness of judges as human beings. ' 's8 Whatever
the reason may be, appellate courts have proved extremely skillful in the devices used to preserve their contempt power. In the absence of legislation
governing contempt proceedings, the legal basis for summary punishment is
found in the "inherent power" of the court, justified by the necessity of assuring the efficient administration of justice, and supported by "immemorial'
usage."9 If statutory obstacles have been raised, courts have selected one of two
s3Ex parte Craig, 193 S.W. 2d 178, r89 (Tex., 1946). For a statement of the facts, see
ibid., at 180-84.
s' Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 375 (1947).
ss "If .... the Texas Court here was not justified in [its] finding ..... 'clear and present
danger' becomes merely a phrase for covering up a novel, iron constitutional doctrine. Hereafter the States cannot deal with direct attempts to influence the disposition of a pending controversy by a summary proceeding, except when the misbehavior physically prevents proceedings from going on in court, or occurs in its immediate proximity. Only the pungent pen of Mr.
justice Holmes could adequately comment on such a perversion of the purpose of his phrase."
Ibid., at 391.
o
56 Ibid., at 39 .
s5Cases cited note 46 supra.
s Nelles and King, op. cit. supra note 5, at 544.
59 But as to "inherent power" and "immemorial usage," see Part III infra.
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courses: (i) construing the statutes so as to render them useless, as the Supreme
Court did in the Toledo case, by holding them merely "declaratory," not limitative, and hence not restrictive of the courts' "inherent power"; (2) declaring the
statutes unconstitutional to the extent that they attempt to curtail that same
"inherent power."
But this resistance did not appear until half of the nineteenth century had
passed. The Act of 1831 represented what was considered at the time an unquestionably valid exercise of legislative power. It had been antedated by legislation
in Pennsylvania6oand NewYork 61growing out of abuses of the contempt power62
similar to that which had caused the attempted impeachment of Judge Peck.
Other states modeled their legislation on the New York, Pennsylvania, and
federal statutes until, in 1855, more than two-thirds of the states had enacted
limitations on the summary power to punish indirect contempts, either by a
"so near thereto" clause or by a provision that certain enumerated acts, "and no
others," should be punishable as contempt. The constitutional validity of the
legislation went unquestioned;3 furthermore, the courts respected legislative
intent by denying the power to punish publications as contempt. 6 4This respect
may have been due to consciousness of the possible consequences had the
judiciary attempted to run counter to the current of legislative thought. 6s Whatever its origin, however, the respect undeniably existed.
Then, in State v. Morrill,66 the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied the power
of the legislature to limit the contempt power. A newspaper article implied that
the Supreme Court had been induced to make a decision by bribery. Under the
statute, declaring that the summary power should apply to certain acts "and no
others," 67 the publication clearly was not subject to punishment as contempt;
but the court held that the attempt to limit the scope of the court's power was
6

oPa. Acts (18o8-9) c. 78.
6
1 N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1828), Part

iii, c. iii, tit. 2, art. i § io.
Respublica v. Oswald, i Dall. (Pa.) 319 (,788); Hollingsworth v. Duane, 12 Fed. Cas.
359, No. 6,616 (C.C.Pa., i8oi); United States v. Duane, 25 Fed. Cas. 920, No. i4,997 (C.C.Pa.,
i8oi); United States v. Wayne, 28 Fed. Cas. 504, No. 16,654 (C.C.Pa., i8oi); Respubica v.
6

Passmore, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 44i (i8o2); Case of J. V. N. Yates, 4 Johns. (N.Y.) 317 (i8og). Full

discussion of these cases may be found in Nelles and King, op. cit. supra note 5, at 409-22.
63 Weaver v. Hamilton, 47 N.C. 343 (1854); State v. Blocker, 14 Ala. 450 (1848); Harrison
v. Missouri, io Mo. 686 (1847); Commonwealth v. Deskins, 4 Leigh (Va.) 685 (1834).
64 Ex parte Hickey, 4 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 751 (1845); Stuart v. People, 3 Scam. (Ill.)
395
(1842); Ex parte Poulson, ig Fed. Cas. 12o5, No. ii,35o (C.C.Pa., 1835).
1-Like theLawless case, both Respublicav. Oswald, i Dall. (Pa.) 319 (1788) and Respublica
v. Passmore, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 441 (i8o2) resulted in nearly successful impeachments of the
judges who had exercised the contempt power. "It was touch and go whether impeachment
would not become an established procedure for taking the judges of a defeated party out of
politics." Nelles and King, op. cit., supra note 5,at 414. Apparently the present-day sanctity
of the judiciary was far from established, and a judge might think twice before controverting
a clear expression of legislative intent on such a controversial issue.
66 x6 Ark. 384 (I855).
6
7Ark. Dig. Stat. (English, 1848) c. 36 § i.
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unconstitutional.

".... . Every enlightened jurist in the United States, who

has treated of the subject, has held that the power to punish for contempts, is
inherent in courts of justice, springing into existence upon their creation, as a
necessary incident to the exercise of the powers conferred upon them."1 9 Since
the power to punish contempts was superstatutory, and not the result of legislative grant, it could not be the subject of legislative curtailment. Thus the federal
statute was distinguished on the basis that the only constitutionally created
federal court was the Supreme Court; the district and circuit courts, having
been created by Congress, are subject to Congressional control of the contempt
power. Under this interpretation, the Act of 1831 places no limitation on the
power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt.70 The Arkansas court concluded that the summary power, founded as it was on "immemorial usage,"
infringed neither the right to trial by jury nor the rights of free speech and a
free press; and therefore that the court could punish in contempt proceedings
the publisher of a libelous article pertaining to pending or past judicial proceedings.
State v. Morrill has been extremely influential in shaping the subsequent
rulings of other state courts; although only a few other courts recognize contempt as a remedy against publications concerning concluded proceedings,7'
even those which limit the scope of punishable publications to statements affecting pending cases follow the rationale of the Morrillcase closely. The decisions
of the California court which ruled on the Bridges case are typical. In 189i, the
California legislature had provided:
....But no speech or publication reflecting upon or concerning any court or
officer thereof shall be treated or punished as a contempt of such court unless made in
the immediate presence of such court and in such a manner as to actually interfere with
its proceedings.Y
68 "The Prohibitoryfeature of the act can be regarded as nothing more than the expression
of a judicial opinion by the Legislature, that the courts may exercise and enforce all their constitutional powers, and answer all the useful purposes of their creation, without the necessity
of punishing as a contempt any matter not enumerated in the act. As such, it is entitled to great
respect, but to say that it is absolutely binding on the courts, would be to concede that the
courts have no constitutional and inherent power to punish any class of contempts, but that
the whole subject is under the control of the legislative department; because, if the General
Assembly may deprive the courts of power to punish one class of contempts, it may go the
whole length, and divest them of power to punish any contempt." State v. Morrill, 16 Ark.
384, 391 (x855).
69Ibid., at 39o.
70 Although the question of the Supreme Court's power to punish for contempt has never
been raised directly, the Court adopted the theory advanced by the Arkansas court in dicta in
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (x924); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., '94 U.S.
324, 327 (I904); Ex parte Robinson, ig Wall. (U.S.) 505, 510 (1873).
7In
re Fite, ii Ga. App. 665, 76 S.E. 397 (1912); State v. Hildreth, 82 Vt. 382, 74 AUt. 71
(igog); In re Providence Journal Co., 28 R.I. 489, 68 Atl. 428 (1907); Burdett v. Commonwealth, 1o3 Va. 838,48 S.E. 878 (19o4); State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 76 S.W.
79 (zgo3); In re Chadwick, iog Mich. 588, 67 N.W. 1071 (z896); In re Moore, 6S N.C. 397
(z869).
7'Cal. Stat. (z8g9) p. 6, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1897) § 1209 (13).
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However, in In re Shorlridgels a strongly worded dictum declared the statute
unconstitutional as an invalid enroachment on the inherent powers of the courts.
The language of the decision discloses the court's heavy reliance on the reasoning of the Morrill case:
No authority has been found which denies the inherent right of a court .... to
punish as a contempt any act .... which tends to impede, embarrass or obstruct the
court in the discharge of its duties ..... It is founded upon the principle-which is
coeval with the existence of the courts, and as necessary as the right of self-protectionthat it is a necessary incident to the execution of the powers conferred upon the
court ..... It exists independently of statute. The legislative department may regulate the procedure and enlarge the power, but it cannot, without trenching upon the
constitutional powers of the court, and destroying the autonomy of that system of
checks and balances which is one of the chief features of our triple-department form of
government, fetter the power itself j4
Despite the Shortridge decision, the California legislature re-enacted the
statute,75 only to encounter new declarations of unconstitutionality grounded
on identical reasoning.76 A third re-enactment 77met the same fate in the Bridges
case7 8 The struggle for power to control contempt proceedings has been more
protracted in California than elsewhere, but the result typifies the situation in
the many jurisdictions following the Arkansas doctrine: in the absence of constitutional limitations on the contempt power, the legislature is helpless to limit
the courts' use-or abuse-of that power.
In some states, even express constitutional provisions have failed to give the
legislature any effective control over punishment for indirect contempts. 9 In
Arkansas, dissatisfaction with the Morrilldecision led to adoption of the state's
constitutional provision authorizing legislative control of the contempt power.
However, the Arkansas court, by use of a fiction, circumvented the clear language of the constitution and a statute providing that certain acts "and no
others" should be punishable as contempt. The court simply ruled that indirect
contempts are committed in the constructive presence of the court on the theory
that misbehavior is committed where it takes effect, thus bringing such acts
73 99

Cal. 526, 34

Pac.

227

(1893).

74Ibid.,

at 532, 229.
75Cal. Stat. (1907) p.

329, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1915) § 1209 (i3).
76In re San Francisco Chronicle, i Cal. 2d 63o, 634,36 P. 2d 369, 370 (i934); In re Shuler,
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Cal. 377, 397,

77 Cal.

292

Pac. 481, 490 (1930).

Stat. (1939) 2731, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, i941) § X209

(ix).

78Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 479, 94 P. 2d 983, 99o (1939).
79Ark. Const. Art. 7 § 26: "The General Assembly shall have power to regulate by law the
punishment of contempts not committed in the presence or hearing of the courts, or in disobedience to process."
Ga. Const. Art. § i par. 2o: "The power of the Courts to punish for contempt shall be
limited by legislative acts."
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within the constitutional exception." In Georgia, the constitutional provision
was nullified by a strained interpretation. The court construed the constitutional clause as empowering the legislature only to prescribe the punishment
after conviction for contempt; hence any attempt to limit thejurisdictionof a
constitutional court to punish contempts to certain specified acts exceeds the
legislative power and is not binding on the courts." Under the "inherent power"
thebry of contempt, then, the courts' power is not only superstatutory, but it
may be superconstitutional. A weapon of this nature, unchecked and virtually
unlimited, furnishes ample justification for the Supreme Court's action in the
Bridges case.
The "inherent power" doctrine has been equally effective in denying a jury
trial to contemners. All American courts have uniformly held that, lacking any
statute on the subject, no right to trial by jury exists in the federal courts under
the Sixth Amendment, or in the state courts, either under the Fourteenth
Amendment or under state constitutional provisions.12 Because of these holdings, coupled with the use of contempt proceedings to punish violations of labor
injunctions, particularly in the Debs and Gompers cases,3 Congress attempted
to curb the summary power of the federal courts with the Clayton Act.84
Despite the narrow scope of the limitation provided by the Clayton Act and
similar statutes, the courts reacted with customary hostility. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared a similar act unconstitutional in
Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney,85 relying on the Morrill case and its "inherent
soWeldon v. State, 15o Ark. 407, 234 S.W. 466 (1921) (altercation between litigant and
judge at bathing resort while court was in recess held contempt in constructive presence of
court); Turk v. State, 123 Ark. 341, i85 S.W. 472 (1916) (intimidation of litigant before reaching courthouse held punishable as contempt "in presence of court"). The constructive presence
device to avoid the limiting effect of a federal type contempt statute was first stated in a dictum in Stuart v. People, 3 Scam. (Ill.) 395, 405 (1842), and was adopted by the Illinois court as
controlling in People v. Wilson, 64 Ill.
195, 211 (1872).
s,Cobb v. State, 187 Ga. 448, 200 S.E. 796 (1939); Bradley v. State, Ii1 Ga. 168, 36 S.E.
630 (I9oo).
82"If it has ever been understood that proceedings according to the common law for contempt of court have been subject to the right of trial by jury, we have been unable to find any
instance of it. It has always been one of the attributes-one of the powers necessarily incident
to a court of justice-that it should have this power of vindicating its dignity, of enforcing its
orders, of protecting itself from insult, without the necessity of calling upon a jury to assist it
in the exercise of this power." Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31,
36 (189o); cf. 50 C.J.S. Juries § 79 (i947); 35 C.J. Juries §99 (1924).

In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (i895); Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914).

83

8438

Stat. 738 (I914), 28 U.S.C.A. § 387 (1928), providing for a jury trial upon demand of

defendant in alimited class of contempt cases. In order to fulfil the requirements of the statute,
the trial had to be (i) for indirect criminal contempt (2) for violation of an injunction (3)where
the act complained of was also a statutory crime.
8s "'The summary power to commit and punish for contempts tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice is inherent in courts ....as essential to the execution of
their powers and to the maintenance of their authority, and is part of the law of the land,
within the meaning of Magna Charta and of the twelfth article of our Declaration of Rights.'

NOTES
power" doctrine. Although the United States Supreme Court held that the
section of the Clayton Act which granted jury trial to criminal contemners was
constitutional,86 its decision relied on the statute's application only to indirect
contempts which were also crimes, and on the power of Congress to regulate the
lower federal courts. 8 7 The opinion not only failed to repudiate the "inherent

power" theory, but approved it.88Since most courts in the state judicial systems
are created by the state constitutions, the Michaelson case does not furnish a
guide to constitutionality in state courts. 89 Nor does it lend comfort to broader
statutes like the Norris-LaGuardia Act,90 which provides for trial by jury in all
indirect contempt cases based on any violation of a labor injunction. 9'
Although the only two appellate courts which have ruled directly on the validity of Norris-LaGuardia type statutes have ruled in their favor, it is significant that the courts were those of Pennsylvania92 and New York, 93 the states
with the oldest statutes limiting punishment for contempt. In both states, the
power of the legislature to curb the jurisdiction of courts in contempt cases has
been long recognized and acquiesced in; accordingly, additional checks on the
contempt power have more chance for success. But the most important feature
of the cases is the brilliant concurring opinion of Justice Maxey of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the PennsylvaniaAnthracite Mining case, an opinion
which won approval by the New York Appellate Division.94 Justice Maxey
blasted the "inherent power" theory as "something akin to the divine right of
....[It] is beyond [the] power of Legislature to curtail jurisdiction of courts over contempts.
.... Any statute requiring a jury trial upon contempt proceedings would be substantial im-,
pairment of the inherent right of courts to maintain their authority." 236 Mass. 310, 315-I7,
128 N.E. 429, 431-32 (1920).
6Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
87See text at note 70 supra.
8S"That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many times
settled and may be regarded as settled law ..... So far as the inferior Federal courts are concerned, however, it is not beyond the authority of Congress [citing cases]; but the attributes
which inhere in that power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered
practically inoperative. That it may be regulated within limits not precisely defined may not be
doubted. The statute now under review is of the latter character. It is of narrow scope, dealing
with the single class where the act or thing constituting the contempt is also a crime in the ordinary sense." 266 U.S. 42, 65, 66 (1924).
89Fort v. Cooperative Farmers' Exchange, 8i Colo. 431, 256 Pac. 319 (1927), held a jury

trial statute unconstitutional, distinguishing the Michaelson case on these grounds.
9047

Stat.

72 (1932), 29

U.S.C.A. § III (1947).

9 The Massachusetts court declared that such a statute would be unconstitutional without
mentioning Michaelson v. United States in In re Opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580, 176

N.E. 649 (193I).

92Pennsylvania Anthracite Mining Co. v. Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania, 318 Pa, 4o,
178 Atl. 291 (1935).
93Kronowitz v. Schlansky, 156 N.Y. Misc. 717, 282 N.Y. Supp. 564 (i935).
94 Ibid.,

at

721,

569.
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kings ..... [which] has been repudiated by modern juristic scholarship."gs He
dismissed the distinction between constitutional and statutory courts as "very
much overdone," declaring that neither type of court possessed such inherent
power. Finally, he presented an argument which, even accepting the "inherent
power" doctrine, destroys the validity of objections to jury trial statutes: "Another fallacy ....

is that the act ....

takes away from the court the right to

punish for disobedience to its process. What is taken away is only the right of
thejudge whose order the respondent is accused of disobeying, to determine unaided by a jury the fact of disobedience ..... The word 'court' and the word
'judge' are not synonymous, and to require a judge to share with a jury the administration of justice does not take away power from 4a court.' "196
Unfortunately, there are too few Justice Maxeys and too few courts willing
to adopt his reasoning. Despite their validity, these arguments have little effect
on the armor with which most courts have encased themselves by repeating the
magic formulae of "inherent power" and "immemorial usage." The Virginia
Supreme Court, overcoming a constitutional mandate that the legislature
should regulate the jurisdiction of the courts, 97 declared a statute providing for
jury trial in contempt cases unconstitutional as violative of the courts' inherent
power. 9s Such superconstitutional power thus invalidates jury trial statutes as
well as statutes limiting the acts punishable as contempt. This broad power can
only be defeated by proof that it is, in fact, neither "inherent" nor based upon
"immemorial usage." And the establishment of such proof requires examination
of the modern juristic scholarship to which Justice Maxey referred.
III
American decisions asserting the validity of summary proceedings in indirect
contempt cases have uniformly followed the reasoning of the Morrill case. The
Morrill case founded its entire claim as to the ancient origin of summary contempt power on Justice Wilmot's opinion in Rex v. Almon99 and Blackstone's
Commentaries"°°-the earliest statements of that power. As a result, the extrajudicial declaration in Almon's Case, although it cannot carry the binding force
of a decision as precedent, has had a more pervasive effect on the law of conPa. 401, 413-14, 178 Atl. 291, 296 (1935).
at 421, 299.
97 Va. Const. § 87.
98"4 ....
[In] the courts created by the constitution there is an inherent power of self-de9318

96Ibid.,

fense and self-preservation; .... this power may be regulated, but cannoi be destroyed, or
so far diminished as to be rendered ineffectual by legislative enactment; .... it is a power
necessarily resident in, and to be exercised by, the courtitself, and .... the vice of an act which
seeks to deprive the court of this inherent power is not cured by providing for its exercise by a
jury." Carter v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 79x, 816, 32 S.E. 780, 785 (1899).
99Due to a formal error in the entitling of the rule nisi, which caused abandonment of the
case, this opinion was never delivered. It was first published thirty-seven years later, after its
author's death, in Wilmot, Notes of Opinions and Judgements 243 (1802).
100

4 B1. Comm. *283.
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tempt than any other single statement. It is probable that Blackstone's discussion of the summary contempt procedure stems directly from Justice Wilmot's
undelivered decision: there is a marked resemblance in phraseology and content between the opinion, written in 1765, and the corresponding section of the
Commentaries,published in 1769; the portion of the Commentariesdealing with
attachment for contempt does not stem from Blackstone's lectures as Vinerian
Professor, as does the remainder of his work; and it is known that Blackstone
submitted proofs of part of the Commentaries to Wilmot for the latter's examination.oz Thus the profound influence of Blackstone on the American law of
contempt'0 can be traced to the ubiquitous Rex v. Almon.
The passage in which virtually the entire present-day law of contempt finds
its origin is as follows:
The power which the courts in Westminster Hall have of vindicating their own
authority is coeval with their first foundation and institution; it is a necessary incident
to every court of justice, whether of record or not, to find and imprison for a contempt
to the court, acted in the face of it, and the issuing attachments by the supreme courts
of justice in Westminster Hall for contempts out of court stands upon the same immemorial usage as supports the whole fabric of the common law; it is as much the
lex terraeand within the exception of Magna Chartaas the issuing any other legal process whatever. I have examined very carefully to see if I could find out any vestiges or
traces of its introduction but can find none. It is as ancient as any other part of the
common law; there is no priority or posteriority to be discovered about it and therefore
cannot be said to invade the common law, but to act in an alliance and friendly conjunction with every other provision which the wisdom of our ancestors has established
for the general good of society. And though I do not mean to compare and contrast
attachments with trial by jury, yet truth compels me to say that the mode of proceeding by attachment stands upon the very same foundation and basis as trial by juries
do-immemorial usage and practice13
If true, this statement would furnish complete substantiation for the stand
which American courts have taken-but it is completely lacking in truth.
Sir John Fox, investigating the English history of contempt I5O years later,
made the startling discovery that Wilmot's claim of the ancient origin of summary procedure in indirect contempt cases was entirely groundless. Fox disclosed the results of his research in a series of law review articles,104 which he
MFox, op. cit. supra note 5, at 21.
-' "The meagreness of Aaerican law libraries contributed, of course, to account for the almost Scriptual authority of Blackstone in our early law." Nelles and King, op. cit. supra note
5, at 405 n. 25.
203 Wilmot, op. cit. supra note 99, at 254.
X04The King v. Almon, 24 L. Q. Rev. 184, 266 (igo8); The Summary Process to Punish
Contempt, 25 L. Q. Rev. 238, 354 (igog); Eccentricities of the Law of Contempt of Court, 36
L. Q. Rev. 394 (1920); The Nature of Contempt of Court, 37 L. Q. Rev. 1gi (1921); The Practice in Contempt of Court Cases, 38 L. Q. Rev. 185 (1922); The Writ of Attachment, 4o L. Q.
Rev. 43 (1924).
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later revised, expanded, and published in book form. 05s Briefly stated, his conclusion was that all indirect criminal contempts, except those alleging disobedience of court orders, were always tried by a jury until 1721, and that the
innovation of summary procedure in the largest group of indirect criminal contempts was far from well established at the end of the eighteenth century.
Prior to the reign of Queen Elizabeth, all indirect criminal contempts had been
tried by indictment or information; then the Star Chamber introduced the procedure of examination upon interrogatories without a jury. When that court
was abolished, the King's Bench resumed its former procedure until Rex v.
Barber, °6 in which an irate Chief Justice, wishing to punish for words contemptuous of the court, adopted the Star Chamber methods. Only nine other
cases, including Rex v. Almon, can be found using the summary procedure before 18oo.-07 In the Court of Chancery, no indirect criminal contempts were
tried by any method whatever until the abolition of the Star Chamber. After
that court ceased to exist, such cases were tried only by information in the
King's Bench or on the common-law side of Chancery until 1742. Then, in
°8
Roach v. GarvanW
Lord Hardwicke established the practice of punishing this
class of contempts by summary procedure, a process followed in only one other
Chancery case during the eighteenth century. 0 9
In cases involving disobedience of court orders or decrees, Fox's research indicated that here, too, criminal contempts were prosecuted solely in jury proceedings until the Star Chamber inaugurated the use of attachments and interrogatories.IO Thus any decision which denies the validity of a statute granting a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings to parties who have violated
injunctions, and which bases that denial on the ground that the statute violates
a court's "necessary and inherent power," is clearly erroneous. Since no other
valid objection has been raised to such statutes, jury trial provisions similar to
those in the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts should receive uniform declarations of constitutionality. However, the fact that summary punishment of
disobedience of court orders, had become the usual practice by the time the
United States Constitution was adopted precludes any claim that, in the absence of statutory provisions, defendants in that class of contempt cases are
entitled to trial by jury as of right.
105Fox, The History of Contempt of Court

(1927).

Xo6i Strange 444 (1721). Contra: Rex v. Revel, i Strange 420 (1721) (when abusive words

"are spoken in the presence of the Justice he may commit, but when it is behind his back the
party can be only indicted").
107 Rex v. Wilkin, K. B. Easter Term (1722); Rex v. Colbatch, K.B. Easter Term (1723);
Rex v. Wiatt, 8 Modem *123 (1723); Rex v. Middleton, Fortescue 201 (,723); Rex v. Bolton,
K.B. Mich. Term (1724); Rex v. Lawley, K.B. Mich. Term (i73i); Rex v. Carroll, i Wilson 75
(i744); Rex v. Almon (1765); Rex v. Steare, 8 How. St. Tr. 6o (768). For discussion of these
cases, see Fox, op. cit. supra note 1o5, at 25-6, 1i1-r5.
1oS2 Atkyns 469 (1742).
09 Cann v. Cann, 2 Ves. Sr. 520 (1754).
110Fox, op. cit. supra note io5, at 89, 93, 103-4-
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In short, then, any attempt to justify the denial of trial by jury in indirect
contempts by pointing to "inherent power" based on "immemorial usage"
must fail. The United States Constitution adopted trial by jury in the criminal
cases in which it existed in1789; and common-law crimes were recognized at the
time the Constitution was ratified."' At the close of the eighteenth century,
summary prosecutions for contempt were not an exclusive remedy; at best, the
summary procedure was exercised alternatively with trial by jury. If this fact
had been known, there is little doubt that American courts of that time would
have included indirect contempt proceedings in the guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment.U Since only a historical error prevented that result, the correction
of that error by Fox's research should certainly preclude courts from declaring
that jury trial statutes for contempt proceedings are unconstitutional. Such
statutes merely revert to the true common law, so that their constitutionality
should be beyond doubt. Furthermore, courts aware of the error should rule,
even without statutes, that defendants in indirect criminal contempt proceedings, if there has been no violation of a valid court order, are entitled to trial by
jury as a matter of right.
But aversion to change and the desire to retain power on the part of courts
prevent this logical result. Missouri's Supreme Court, ruling on a contempt of
court charge for publishing articles criticizing the trial court's conduct in a past
case,"3 had full knowledge of Fox's work. The court discussed Almon's Case,
noted that Wilmot's opinion was probably the foundation of Blackstone's statement of the contempt power, and pointed out that ". ... exhaustive historical
research in recent years has proved that Wilmot was wrong and that the power
he claimed had never been exercised by the common-law courts, but only in a
few instances by the court of Star Chamber. Sir John Fox, Contempt of Court,
ch. 2."11 Yet the court's conclusion was that although a publication concerning
a closed case is not punishable as a contempt of court, a publication concerning
a pending case may be so punished. Unfortunately, the court's citation of Fox
proved too much for its decision to be valid. Nowhere in his work was any distinction made between criticism of pending and past cases-his conclusions applied with equal strength to both classes. Thus if the court accepted Fox's conclusion that there was no common-law basis for Wilmot's opinion and thereby
barred summary punishment of publications relating to closed cases, it could not
logically assert the existence of a power of summary punishment for comment
on pending cases. However, the practice of "selective citation" allowed the
- Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 114 (1925).
X12The strong feeling of the times toward the right of jury trial can be seen in one of the
charges against King George III in the Declaration of Independence: "He has combined with
others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution and unacknowledged by our
laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation ....For depriving us in many
cases of the benefits of Trial by Jury."
"3 State

ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Coleman, 347 Mo. 1238,
"141bid., at r258, 647.

152 S.W. 2d

640 (1941).
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Missouri court to perpetuate a manufactured distinction which has no foundation in the common law and little foundation in logic.
Other courts have similarly distorted the results of Fox'sresearch in reaching
decisions completely opposed to the author's conclusions."15 Intelligent opinions
both recognizing the significance of Fox's discoveries and applying them correctly to rectify long-established errors have never been handed down by the
majority of any court. Justice Maxey's statement in the PennsylvaniaAnthracite
Mining case was a concurring opinion;"16 Justice Edmonds of the California
Supreme Court, arguing against the applicability of summary contempt proceedings in the Bridges case, was forced to dissent."17 Although it is undeniable
that "....

. the courts have built a structure of judicial reasoning upon the

sands of precedents which do not exist,""
is not yet solved.

8

the problem of razing this structure

IV
Despite their attempts to preserve the contempt power intact, courts have
always been uneasy because of the summary procedure involved. Even Blackstone, the staunchest upholder of the summary power as necessary to the existence of the courts, admitted that it was" ....not agreeable to the genius of
the common law in any other instance."' 9 This uneasiness has translated itself
into the gradual process of conferring on the contemnor the rights of a defendant
in a true criminal proceeding. At first, only notice and a reasonable opportunity
to defend" ° were necessary for the validity of the proceedings in any out-ofcourt contempt. The basically criminal nature of the offense and punishment
led ,thefederal courts to extend to the alleged contemnor the presumption of
innocence,"' the privilege against self-incrimination,"' and the requirement that
his guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt.- Finally, Judge Learned
"isBridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 285-88 (194i) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Bridges
v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 481-84, 94 P. 2d 983, 991-93 (1939).
216Note 95 supra.
"17
Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 494, 94 P. 2d 983, 998 (1939).
2S Ibid., at 49s, 999.
-94 B1. Comm. *287.
-0 Taft, C. J., in Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925): "Due process of law,
therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that committed in open court, requires
that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet
them by way of defense or explanation. We think this includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, and the right to call witnesses to give testimony, relevant either to the issue of complete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense and in mitigation of the penalty to be imposed." This rule was applied in Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267 (I889), which adopted the
established procedure in disbarment proceedings as described in Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall.
(U.S.)

523, 540

(1868).

Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911); Western Fruit Growers
v. Gotfried, 136 F. 2d 98, ioo (C.C.A. 9th, 1943); In re Eskay, 122 F. 2d 819, 822 (C.C.A. 3d,
1941); see Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924).
Cases cited note 121 supra.
' Cases cited note 12i supra; Inre McIntosh, 73 F. 2d 908, 9IO (C.C.A. 9th, 1934); Sabin
v. Fogarty, 70 Fed. 482, 485 (C.C. Wash., i895).
"

NOTES

Hand, in McCann v. New York Stock Exchange,124 set up the requirement that
criminal contempt proceedings must be prosecuted by the United States district attorney or by an attorney appointed by the court; in the latter case, the
papers supporting the process must show the criminal nature of the proceeding.2s The Supreme Court incorporated all of these protections into Rule 4 2(b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," 6 so that the defendant is now accorded all the procedural safeguards to which a criminal defendant is entitledexcept trial by jury. Most state courts have also balked at this final step. Until
now, the jury trial safeguard has been denied because of the belief that an inherent power of summary punishment existed in this class of cases; with that
belief undermined, it is only necessary to find that recognizing the right to jury
trial will be a desirable step.
Any discussion of the jury-trial requirement as it applies in the federal
courts, of course, would be purely academic. The Act of 1831, as it has been
interpreted by the Nye case, removes all out-of-court misconduct of the type
with which Fox's investigation dealt from summary punishment as contempt,
so that such conduct is punishable only if made a crime by Congressional action.127 In the state courts, on the other hand, the Bridges decision precludes any
form of punishment of out-of-court publications, whether by summary attachment or in a jury proceeding, unless the publication constitutes a "clear and
present danger" to the administration of justice. However, the application of
the "clear and present danger" rule by a single judge is, to say the least, not
conducive to best results, particularly if the judge is the same one whose conduct has been attacked by the publication. The defendant is forced to pay the
costs of an appeal, sometimes to the Supreme Court, with each successive court
acting as a jury in its determination of whether the facts meet the standard. It
was pointed out earlier that the "clear and present danger" test is applied by a
jury in all other cases;X
"2 since social policy, reason, and common law all demand
a jury trial in this instance, there seems no basis for denying it.
The universal application of trial by jury in indirect criminal contempts, in
light of the state court opposition discussed in Part II, can only be accomplished
-4 8c F. 2d 211, 214 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935).

SThe procedure required by Judge Hand was adopted by other circuit courts in Western
Fruit Growers v. Gotfried, 136 F. 2d 98, ioi (C.C.A. 9th, 1943); In re Eskay, i2 F. 2d 819,
823 (C.C.A. 3d, 1941); FTC v. A. McLean and Son, 94 F. 2d 802, 8o4 (C.C.A. 7th, 1938).

,26 "A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule [contempts committed in the actual presence of the court] shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state
the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and
shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as
such ..... The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress
so provides ..... If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that
judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent."
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) following 18 U.S.C.A. § 687 (Supp., 1946).
=27United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 32 (1813).
128Cases cited note 46 supra.
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by the United States Supreme Court, and hence only through the medium of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It has often been contended that the Fourteenth
Amendment was meant by its proponents to apply to the safeguards set out in
the Bill of Rights so as to prevent their infringement by the states, and therefore that it should have that effectY9 Although four justices on the present
Supreme Court follow such a view,r30 a majority of the Court has never held
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates, as such, the specific guarantees
found in the first eight amendments. But the assertion that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires state courts to grant jury trials in all indirect criminal
contempt cases which do not charge disobedience of court orders need not rest
solely on the ground that trial by jury in criminal cases is dealt with in the Sixth
Amendment. ". . . . [It] is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded
by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded
against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process
of law ..... If this is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the
first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are
included in the conception of due process of law.1'x31 If the right to jury trial can
be shown to be implicit in the concept of due process of law as that concept applies in indirect criminal contempt proceedings, the Fourteenth Amendment
must be held to guarantee trial by jury in such cases. Due process of law, in
this sense, has been defined as consisting of those settled usages and procedures
existing in England before the establishment of our country, which were not in
conflict with our political ideals.132 And no proceedings can fit that definition
more closely than jury trials in indirect criminal contempts, examined in the
light of Fox's research. The inevitable conclusion is that the Constitution requires state courts to grant trial by jury to defendants charged with indirect
criminal contempts unless they have disobeyed court orders.
Each of the two sharply differing views on the Court as to the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment has criticized the opposing theory's "subjective test."133
29Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474 (i942) (Black, J., dissenting); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 14 (i9o8) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 58i, 6o5 (igoo)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 363 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting);
Hurtado v. California, iio U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Slaughter-House
Cases, i6 Wall. (U.S.) 36, 83, 1i, 124 (1872) (Field, Bradley, Swayne, JJ., and Chase, Ch. J.,
dissenting); Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 84 ff., 210-77 (19o8).
3o Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123, 123-25 (1947) (dissenting opinions); Foster

v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139-41, 141-45 (1947) (dissenting opinions).
"3 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (19o8); see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-

8

(1932).

132 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, ioo (19o8); Holden v. Hardy, I69 U.S. 366, 39o
(i898); Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 320 (1892); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co.,
i8 How. (U.S.) 272, 280 (18s).

'33 Compare Justice Frankfurter's defense of "natural law" as the antithesis of "subjective
selection" in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 65 (i47) with Justice Black's attack on
"natural law" as synonymous with "subjective selection," ibid., at 69-70.

NOTES

Yet either view, consistently applied, would provide jury trials in constructive
criminal contempt cases. Under both theories, due process requires different
procedural safeguards in different situations: a prosecution which fulfils the
demands of due process in punishing a direct contempt may not suffice if the
alleged contempt was committed out of court. 34 Justice Cardozo, expressing
we reach a different plane of
the majority rationale, has suggested that ...

social and moral values when we pass to the privileges and immunities that
have been taken over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and
brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption. These
in their origin were effective against the federal government alone. If the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed them, the process of absorption has had its
source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.' X3s If this is so, then the climb of our "social and moral values" has
been a slow one indeed; even the basic right of freedom of speech was only
"absorbed" by the Fourteenth Amendment fifty-seven years after its adoption.z36

Admittedly, the denial of jury trial in one class of contempt cases is not of
the same broad sweep as the denial of free speech or a free press; perhaps it does
not stand on the same plane in the scale of civil liberties. But Justice Cardozo's
analysis is not exclusive. Unyielding application of the "inherent power" and
"immemorial usage" doctrine by state courts has thwarted all legislative attempts to abolish summary proceedings in indirect contempts. Even if it is admitted that the "Fourteenth Amendment did not mean to imprison the States
into the limited experience of the eighteenth century,"'' 3 application of the
jury trial guarantee in this class of cases is preferable to the present self-imposed
imprisonment into the more limited experience of the nineteenth century. A
declaration by the Supreme Court that due process of law in constructive
criminal contempt cases, except those charging violation of court decrees, includes trial by jury would be far better than perpetuating a useless fiction with
its roots in one of the least desirable practices of the Star Chamber.

THE SEDITION TRIAL: A STUDY IN DELAY
AND OBSTRUCTION
On January 3, x944, a federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., returned an
indictment charging thirty defendants! with conspiracy, together with officials
'34

See Ex parte Oliver, 16 U.S.L. Week

135 Palko
z36

v. Connecticut,

302

U.S.

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.

4240, 4245 (1948).

319, 326

(1937).

652 (1925).

Frankfurter concurring in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
332 U.S. 46 (1947).
I These were Joseph E. McWilliams, George E. Deatherage, William Dudley Pelley, James
True, James Edward Smythe, Lawrence Dennis, Howard Victor Broenstrupp alias Count
137 justice

468 (1947); see Adamson v. California,

